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1. Introduction 
This article is concerned with animal welfare governance in an era in which both public and 
private bodies set standards by which animals are reared and sourced for food in a global market 
for agricultural produce. It explores the roles and responsibilities of standard setters in the 
regulation of farm animal welfare in a ‘transnational regulatory space’,1 that is ‘one which 
crosses national borders.’2 Private animal welfare assurance schemes purportedly set standards 
which go beyond, and fill lacunae in, the public animal welfare standards of the European 
Union (EU) and of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE)3 in its Terrestrial Animal 
Health Code (TAHC). Nevertheless, the potential exists for international collective private 
business standards to be able to steer the global agri-food chain and impact unfavourably on 
stakeholders affected by, and interested in, animal welfare standards for agricultural produce. 
Following the introduction, section two acknowledges the public animal welfare standards 
adopted by the EU and the OIE, respectively, regarding the wellbeing of food producing 
animals. The EU, a pioneer in animal welfare governance, endorses the intergovernmental, 
science-based animal welfare standards of the OIE in the OIE TAHC. The focus is on the 
evolution alongside of voluntary private transnational animal welfare standards and 
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particularly collective schemes, which, in turn, raise questions as to whether they are able to 
justify their authority to determine standards of animal welfare in agricultural produce to 
stakeholders external to the business regulatory regime. This article characterises ‘regulatory 
regime’ as ‘that of a transnational non-state regulator,’ the activities of which ‘are not based on 
or mandated by national, supranational, or international law.’ 4   
Section three then takes as a case study the international collective private standards 
scheme of GLOBALG.A.P. (Global Good Agricultural Practice) and the GLOBALG.A.P. 
Integrated Farm Assurance (IFA) Livestock Certificate. The methodology is desk-based in 
presenting GLOBALG.A.P. standard setting procedures for its Livestock Standard, inclusive 
of animal welfare. The organisation’s internal governance rules are extracted from the 
corporate information available on GLOBALG.A.P.’s website. GLOBALG.A.P. operates a 
business to business (B2B) Integrated Farm Assurance Certificate for Livestock, prima facie a 
private voluntary Standard but one with the potential to become the industry norm, de facto 
controlling producer access to the global agri-food market.5 Brief consideration is given to 
whether GLOBALG.A.P.’s Livestock Standard can accommodate small-scale producers, in 
particular from developing countries, seeking an outlet in the global agri-food chain.  
Literature underscores the positive strategies undertaken by GLOBALG.A.P. which 
augment its legitimacy vis á vis significant stakeholder communities, for example beyond 
Europe - developing countries,6 or certification and accreditation organisations and indirectly, 
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thereby, the State.7  This article identifies the need to seek consumer legitimacy since there is 
a noticeable gap in the reach of GLOBALG.A.P. to such a stakeholder external to the regulatory 
regime, the consumer albeit a key player in the global agri-food chain. Spencer Henson notes 
that ‘[c]onsumers have increasingly focused on a broader array of food …process attributes 
when assessing food product quality…  encompass[ing] the manner in which products are 
produced (for example…animal welfare) – which are credence characteristics.’8 Moreover, 
consumer interest in the welfare standards under which food producing animals are raised 
evidently is strong. The findings of a survey conducted for the European Commission9 
established that more than nine in ten EU citizens (94 per cent) believe it is important to protect 
the welfare of farmed animals, with 82 per cent of Europeans surveyed believing that the 
welfare of farmed animals should be better protected than it is now. The relative majority of 
European respondents thought the welfare of farmed animals should be handled jointly, 
between businesses and public authorities (43 per cent), with an additional 40 per cent believing 
that animal welfare is a matter for all citizens, which should be regulated by public authorities.  
It is deemed necessary, also, for GLOBALG.A.P. to enjoy legitimacy from the State. 
The State is external to the governance rules and private regulatory standards of 
GLOBALG.A.P. Yet, the State is also a stakeholder affected by GLOBALG.A.P.’s animal 
welfare standards; more precisely by the potential for the latter private organisation to 
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undermine the standards of the major international public animal welfare standard-setter, the 
OIE, and in that State interests in maximising trade may be negatively impacted.10  
The general concept of legitimacy relied upon is that of empirical / social legitimacy, 
involving the subjective acceptance of the Standard by both the consumer and the State. This 
article, further, adopts the theory of deliberative democracy achieved through ‘reasoned 
participation’ and ‘deliberation’,11 as a source of ‘output-oriented’ legitimacy12 to underpin its 
proposals to enhance external legitimacy. Essentially, it proposes ‘real’ consumer 
participation,13 ‘thick proceduralization’,14 and mutually reinforcing dialogue15 manifest in a 
memorandum of understanding between the private organisation and the State. A second 
conception of legitimacy forms the substance of the proposals advanced, namely the need for 
science, also, to underpin the private collective Standard.16  
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responses to non-state certification programs’ (2014) 8 Regulation & Governance 74, 86-88. 
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The article then builds upon the external legitimacy thus gained from the consumer and 
the State. The approach taken is to project beyond the external legitimacy sourced through both 
deliberative discourse and a science base and to promote the positive prospects of private 
standardisation in animal welfare via market instruments and soft law mechanisms. It is in this 
regard that recommendations are made for an enhanced animal welfare private label and 
corresponding information – and for the adoption of positive terms within a public / private 
memorandum of understanding. 
The emphasis in section four is on the steps GLOBALG.A.P. should initiate with the 
agri-food consumer, a stakeholder external to GLOBALG.A.P.’s governance rules based upon 
membership and its B2B certificate. This article examines ways in which interested consumers 
are, and might be, offered opportunities to partake in GLOBALG.A.P.’s Livestock Standard 
procedures and argues that GLOBALG.A.P. should cater for agri-food consumers with animal 
welfare credence demands. Deliberative democracy is advocated as the basis for consumer 
legitimacy, to be achieved through participation17 and two-way ‘reasoned discourse’18 towards 
reaching a ‘substantive solution’19 on animal welfare standards. The approach advanced is that 
expert-fed decision-making fuelled with science can work constructively with a participating 
public20 and that there is a need to base standard-setting on both legitimising sources to reach 
an ‘effective’ outcome21 involving both science and values. Acting to reinforce its external 
legitimacy vis á vis consumers of added-value animal welfare produce, furthermore, could be 
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a catalyst to the continued success of the GLOBALG.A.P. Livestock Standard and raised 
animal welfare standards. 
This article contends that GLOBALG.A.P., currently, is missing an opportunity 
constructively to engender behavioural change22  in consumers of agricultural produce in an 
extended value chain. Once consumer legitimacy is attained for GLOBALG.A.P.’s Standard a 
marketing opportunity is presented to GLOBALG.A.P. to promote its Livestock Standard to 
the ethical agri-food consumer via  a GLOBALG.A.P. animal welfare label and an information 
platform, so as further to incentivise demand for its enhanced animal welfare agri-produce.  
The major intergovernmental animal welfare standard setting organisation, the OIE, has 
serious concerns about the potential for private standards to have trade-limiting and trade-
distorting effects and considers that it is important to prevent the haphazard introduction of 
non-science-based measures, in relation to both animal health and welfare.23 Reciprocal 
interests ensue. It is necessary, therefore, for GLOBALG.A.P. also to realise the legitimacy of 
the OIE so that its private Livestock Standard is endorsed with the acceptance of the 
internationally recognised animal welfare standard-setter. Towards this end, section five 
explores the scope for a hybrid model of governance to legitimate GLOBALG.A.P.’s Standard. 
Recourse to a hybrid model of meta-regulation, which receives consideration, is not the 
proposed solution. Instead, this article suggests an alternative hybrid model, namely the soft 
law mechanism of a memorandum of understanding, its terms achieved through deliberative 
interaction and mutually reinforcing dialogue, and essentially based upon science. It is 
contended that the internationally recognised major public stakeholder may, thereby, accord 
external legitimacy to the Standard of the private animal welfare regulatory regime. In 
promoting such relations this article adds to the literature on transnational business governance 
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interactions in several domains,24 notably, for example, forestry,25 fisheries,26 climate change,27 
biofuels,28 marine shipping29 and food safety.30  A soft-law hybrid model of animal welfare 
governance deemed relevant to the complex domain of animal welfare is proposed, which 
complements the diverse solutions adopted in the aforementioned policy areas. Such a 
legitimising model of hybrid animal welfare governance is projected to maximise the prospects 
presented by private standardisation in a global market for animal welfare added-value agri-
food, with the objective of elevating animal welfare standards beyond a ‘niche’ market in an 
extended food chain. This article reasons that the deliberative interaction between the public 
and the private animal welfare standard setters is in the interest of GLOBALG.A.P. with the 
potential to raise animal welfare standards in agriculture. It portrays a positive role for the State 
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27 Kenneth Abbott, ‘Strengthening the Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change’ (2014) 3 
Transnational Environmental Law 57. 
28 Yoshiko Naiki, ‘Trade and bioenergy: explaining and assessing the regime complex for sustainable bioenergy’ 
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as the ‘facilitator’ of the private collective Standard’s31 higher standards of animal welfare in 
the global agri-produce market. 
 
2. Animal Welfare Governance 
2.1 Public Standards 
The EU has been a pioneer in adopting legislation reconciling the welfare of certain farm 
animals with the common organisation of the EU market for agricultural produce. An early 
Directive established general minimum standards of farm animal welfare,32 followed by 
minimum standards of protection specific to calves, pigs, broiler chickens and laying hens.33 
EU animal welfare norms are not all encompassing, and species-specific standards do not exist, 
for example, for dairy cows, beef cattle, sheep, goats, turkeys and ducks, the sole requirements 
currently in existence being general in nature and difficult to apply in instances of an actual 
species’ needs.34  
The OIE has had a mandate to develop animal welfare standards since 2002. The then 
Ad hoc Group on animal welfare believed the OIE to be well placed to provide international 
leadership on animal welfare.  It noted the OIE’s seventy-five year history of achievement as 
the international reference organisation for animal health, acknowledging the essential link 
                                                          
31 Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New 
Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit’ (2009) 42 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 501, 501-
2, 576-7. 
32  Council Dir 98/58/EC concerning the protection of animals kept for farming purposes [1998] OJ L221/23. 
Drawn up on the basis of the European Convention on the Protection of Animals kept for Farming Purposes ETS 
No. 87 (10 March 1976); approved by Council Dec (EEC) 78/923 [1978] OJ L323/12. 
33 See now, for example, Council Dir 2008/120/EC laying down minimum standards for the protection of pigs 
[2009] OJ L47/5. 
34  Commission Strategy for the Protection and Welfare of Animals (2012-2015) COM (2012) 6 final.   
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between animal health and animal welfare.35 The International Committee of the OIE 
established a permanent OIE Working Group on Animal Welfare,36 following which Member 
Countries have adopted science-based animal welfare standards in accordance with democratic 
procedures.37 OIE guiding principles explain that the scientific assessment of animal welfare 
involves diverse elements, and that selecting and weighing these elements often involves value-
based assumptions.38 An animal is in a good state of welfare if (as indicated by scientific 
evidence) it is healthy, comfortable, well-nourished, safe, able to express innate behaviour, and 
if it is not suffering from unpleasant states such as pain, fear, and distress.39 Scientific 
assessment, thus, forms the basis for specific OIE animal welfare recommendations, measured, 
for example, by assessing the degree of impaired functioning associated with injury, disease, 
malnutrition, or, for example, by measuring preferences, motivations and aversions in order to 
                                                          
35 World Organisation for Animal Health, Resolution No XIV (2002) Animal Welfare Mandate of the OIE 
http://www.oie.int/about-us/key-texts/basic-texts/new-mandates/  >accessed 19 November 2017. 
36  World Organisation for Animal Health, Resolution No XXVI Animal Welfare 72 GS/FR-Paris (May 2004). 
37  OIE standards are approved by the World Assembly of Delegates meeting annually at the OIE General Session. 
Prior to this, the Animal Welfare Group reports to the Code Commission, which determines how to incorporate 
into the standards scientific recommendations received from, for example, OIE member Countries, OIE partner 
organisations and both private sector and non-governmental organisations, in order to ensure that the standards 
are based on comprehensive and up-to-date scientific information.  Procedures used by the OIE to set Standards 
and Recommendations for International Trade, with a Focus on the Terrestrial and Aquatic  
Animal Health Codes, 
http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Internationa_Standard_Setting/docs/pdf/A_OIE_procedures_standards_
2016.pdf      >accessed 19 November 2017. 
38 World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), International Terrestrial Animal Health Code (TAHC) Version 
2017©OIE, art 7.1.2. 
39 ibid art 7.1.1. 
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provide information on animals’ needs and affective states, such as hunger, pain and fear.40 
OIE TAHC Chapters address the welfare of beef cattle, broiler chickens and dairy cattle in their 
respective production systems.41 It is, however, conceivable that countries with diverse 
economies, cultures and environmental conditions reach consensus by the lowest common 
denominator and, in this regard, the OIE has resolved that ‘[a]nimal welfare is a complex, 
multi-faceted, international and domestic public policy issue, with important scientific, ethical, 
economic, cultural, and political and trade policy dimensions.’42  
The EU has confirmed its continuing endorsement of OIE standard-setting and 
implementation of OIE animal welfare standards.43 EU animal welfare standards, currently, 
tend to be more prescriptive than those of the OIE, the latter orientated towards animal welfare 
outcome assessment. In a Joint Declaration, the OIE and the EU have committed to providing 
mutual support and to cooperating on all aspects of animal welfare, stressing the need for 
adequate scientific expertise.44 The EU is represented in the OIE Animal Welfare Working 
                                                          
40  ibid art 7.1.3. 
41 OIE TAHC (2017) s 7 Animal Welfare Chs 7.9–7.11, 
http://www.oie.int/index.php?id=169&L=0&htmfile=titre_1.7.htm  >accessed 19 November 2017. General 
principles provide guidance for the welfare of animals in livestock production systems OIE TAHC (2017) art 
7.1.4. Work is in progress in the ad hoc Group on Animal Welfare and Pig Production Systems and a draft chapter 
on Animal Welfare and Pig Production Systems is appended to the Report of the Fifteenth Meeting of the OIE 
Animal Welfare Working Group Annex 7, app VII (2016) 
http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Animal_Welfare/docs/pdf/AWWG_Reports/A_Report_AWWG_2016.p
df  >accessed 19 November 2017. 
42  World Organisation for Animal Health, Resolution No 28 Animal Welfare 83 GS/FR-PARIS (May 2015). 
43  World Organisation for Animal Health, Report of the Tenth Meeting of the Animal Welfare Working Group 
(2011) http://www.oie.int/doc/ged/D11313.PDF >accessed 19 November 2017. 
44 Press Release, https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/animals/docs/aw_international_joint_dec_aw_en.pdf 
> accessed 19 November 2017. Council of Europe ‘Joint Declaration on Animal Welfare in Europe: 
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Group and action supportive of international cooperation in animal welfare remains a key EU 
objective.45 
 
2.2 Private Standards 
Private farm assurance standards in animal welfare have arisen alongside these public 
standards, the private sector being motivated to ‘address consumer concerns and to harness 
these concerns as a means to compete in quality-defined markets.’46 Private standards are those 
standards developed and adopted by private bodies.47 They are voluntary and in this sense are 
standards with which compliance is not mandatory in accordance with the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).48 Standards, as such, 
are distinguished from regulations with which compliance is mandatory under the TBT 
Agreement.49 Enhanced animal welfare is stipulated in private individual and collective 
international standards of good agricultural practice and accompanying B2B certification 
                                                          
achievements and future prospects’ (24 November 2006 Strasbourg) 
https://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-
operation/biological_safety_and_use_of_animals/seminar/CoE_EU_OIE_Final-Declaration_final.24.11.06.pdf  
> accessed 19 November 2017    
45  Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment SEC (2012) 55, 43, Annex 5C, 108.  
46 Henson (n 8) 68. 
47 Spencer Henson and John Humphrey, ‘Understanding the Complexities of Private Standards in Global Agri-
Food Chains as They Impact Developing Countries’ (2010) 46 (9) The Journal of Development Studies 1628, 
1630. 
48 World Trade Organization Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, 1868 UNTS (1994), Annex 1 2. Standard.  
49 ibid Annex 1 1.Technical regulation. 
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schemes.50 Individual retailer animal welfare assurance schemes, including those of Marks and 
Spencer51 and Waitrose,52 for example, singularly focus on the promotion of higher animal 
welfare standards in their sourced food produce, which go beyond the minimum legislative 
norms. Private collective standards are developed by company / industry actors from beyond a 
single company / industry.53 
 
2.2.1 Regulatory concerns 
According to Linda Fulponi, ‘[m]any of the private voluntary standards schemes are becoming 
global standards as the food system becomes interlinked across the world.’54 Retailer 
consolidation aided by contemporary methods of doing business - by food, communications 
and transportation technologies - enables the sourcing of agricultural produce meeting animal 
                                                          
50 OECD, Final Report on ‘Private Standards and the Shaping of the Agro-Food System’, Executive Summary 
para 3; Report paras 13-15, AGR/CA/APM(2006)9/FINAL.   
51 Marks and Spencer Policy for Farm Animal Health and Welfare (July 2016) 
.https://corporate.marksandspencer.com/documents/plan-a-our-approach/foods-2016/mns-farm-animal-health-
and-welfare-policy.pdf    >accessed 19 November 2017. 
52 Waitrose: Animal Welfare at Waitrose (July 2016) 
http://www.waitrose.com/content/dam/waitrose/Inspiration/Waitrose%20Way/Animal%20welfare/Master%20B
BFAW%20narrative%202016.pdf?wtrint=1-Content-_-2-Inspiration-_-3-
waitrose_animal_welfarecommitments-_-4--_-5-button-_-6-animalwelfare >accessed 19 November 2017. 
53 Anne Tallontire, ‘CSR and Regulation: towards a framework for understanding private initiatives in the agri-
food chain (2007) 28(4) Third World Quarterly 775. 
54 Linda Fulponi, ‘Private voluntary standards in the food system: The perspective of major food retailers in OECD 
countries’ (2006) 31(1) Food Policy 1, 4. 
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welfare standards across State boundaries.55 Private regulatory regimes are ‘frequently driven 
by the changes in global value chains and in international trade.’56 Steven Bernstein and 
Benjamin Cashore maintain that ‘operationally, they use global supply chains’ and ‘aim to 
reconfigure markets.’57 The potential exists, thus, for private international collective animal 
welfare standards schemes to become powerful regulatory regimes able to control the global 
agri-food chain, with consequences for countries’ economies.58  The outcome could be that 
what are prima facie voluntary animal welfare standards may de facto become mandatory and 
in reality the industry norm, compliance with which determines market access. In this regard, 
concern has been expressed in the World Trade Organization, as articulated by Linda Fulponi,  
the retailer scheme [individual or collective] may be de facto applied as the industry 
norm by all actors in the supply chain. Thus the choice of whether or not to comply 
with a voluntary standard becomes a choice between compliance or exit from the 
market. 59 
Private collective international animal welfare standard and certification schemes may 
present particular problems for the small producer.60 Exclusionary effects may result for those 
                                                          
55 Spencer Henson and John Humphrey, ‘The Impacts of Private Food Safety Standards on the Food Chain and 
on Public Standard-Setting Processes’ 10 (2009) Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, ALINORM 09/32/9D-Part II. 
56 Cafaggi (n 1) 102. 
57 Steven Bernstein and Benjamin Cashore, ‘Can non-State global governance be legitimate? An analytical 
framework’ (2007) 1 Regulation & Governance 347, 348, 350. 
58 Botterill and Daugbjerg (n 5) 489.  
59 World Trade Organization (WTO), Communication from Linda Fulponi, ‘Private Voluntary Standards and 
Developing Country Market Access: Preliminary Results’ para 9 (2007) OECD G/SPS/GEN/763 (27 Feb 2007).  
60 The issue of private standards was first raised at the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) 
(29-30 June 2005) (G/SPS/R/37/Rev.1, paras 16-20) when Saint Vincent and the Grenadines raised a concern 
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smaller producers who lack the capacity to engage with the schemes’ substantive requirements 
because of the disproportionate costs of so doing.61 This would be the more likely prevalent 
especially for producers in developing countries where domestic laws have not protected 
animal welfare to the extent of the governing private standard.62 Could standards be determined 
by private interest market differentiation objectives63 instead of being firmly embedded in 
science, especially where there are no legal norms? Do the private animal welfare standards 
exceed, or duplicate, the legal minimum animal welfare norms with which compliance is 
required, and at extra cost?64 How is legitimacy to govern realised where private transnational 
regulatory regimes are not subject to the mechanisms in place constitutionally with which to 
hold public regulators to account?65 This article considers the potential for private transnational 
animal welfare regulatory regimes to perpetuate their effects on stakeholders external to their 
                                                          
regarding the trade effects on small farmers of EurepG.A.P.’s standards for pesticides on imports of bananas. 
World Trade Organization (WTO), ‘Private Standards and the SPS Agreement’ Note by the Secretariat, 
G/SPS/GEN/746. 
61 Henson and Humphrey (n 55) 30. 
62 Miet Maertens and Johan FM Swinnen, ‘Transformations in agricultural markets:  Standards and their 
implications’ (2006) Working Paper No 11, Leuven Interdisciplinary Research Group on International  
Agreements and Development, 10, 
https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/working_papers/archive/wp11.pdf  
 >accessed 19 November 2017. 
63 Jane Korinek, Mark Melatos, Marie-Luise Rau, ‘A Review of Methods for Quantifying the Trade Effects of 
Standards in the Agri-Food Sector’ (2008) OECD Trade Policy Working Paper No 79, 5, note 1, 
TAD/TC/CAWP(2007)1/FINAL. 
64 Michael Scannell, ‘Private Standards in the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Area’ 76th General Session, International 
Committee, World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) Paris (25-30 May 2008) 76 SG/10 points 2-4. 
65 Fabrizio Cafaggi, ‘New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation’ (2011) 38(1) Journal of Law and 
Society 20, 49.  
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organisational governance, albeit those stakeholders having an interest in the private standards 
that ensue. In order to explore the problem identified, namely the lacunae in external legitimacy 
to govern, this article draws upon the leading industry Standard of GLOBALG.A.P. 
  
3. The GLOBALG.A.P. IFA Standard Livestock 
 The European retailers’ 1997 initiative, EUREPGAP, became GLOBALG.A.P. in 2007, the 
private collective business to business standard of Good Agricultural Practice. 
GLOBALG.A.P. claims to be ‘the internationally recognized standard for farm production.’66 
GLOBALG.A.P. certification endorses animal welfare, food safety, sustainability, 
environmental protection and workers’ health and safety in more than 120 countries.67 The 
GLOBALG.A.P. Certificate / IFA Standard Livestock consists of Control Points and 
Compliance Criteria (CPCC) which define the requirements for the All Farm Base Module, the 
Livestock Scope Module and the respective Sub-scope Module[s] necessary to attain the 
Standard. There are six Sub-scopes, namely, cattle and sheep, dairy, calf and young beef, pigs, 
poultry and turkeys.68 General Regulations further stipulate general compliance 
requirements.69 The IFA Version V Livestock rules on animal welfare introduced changes 
                                                          
66  http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/what-we-do/globalg.a.p.-certification/globalg.a.p./ >accessed 19 November 
2017. 
67 http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/who-we-are/about-us/history/ >accessed 19 November 2017. 
68 http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/for-producers/globalg.a.p./integrated-farm-assurance-ifa/livestock/  > 
accessed 19 November 2017.    
69 GLOBALG.A.P. General Regulations Part I - General Requirements: Version 5.1 (1 July 2017, obligatory 1 
October 2017) http://www.globalgap.org/.content/.galleries/documents/170630_GG_GR_Part-I_V5_1_en.pdf 
 > accessed 19 November  2017.   See also, General Regulations Livestock Rules: Version 5.1 (July 2017,  
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concerning the integration of outcome-based criteria; housing and facilities; feed and water 
provisions; livestock health; responsible use of medicines; livestock transport; and Chain of 
Custody Certification.70  
GLOBALG.A.P. offers two voluntary animal welfare ‘add-on’ modules, for 
poultry/broiler chickens and for pigs/finishers, to enhance certification.71 An ad hoc 
GLOBALG.A.P. Stakeholder Committee on Animal Welfare worked on these criteria from 
2011-13, comprised of producers, processors, retailers, and representatives from certification 
bodies, academia and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). It is significant to this article’s 
stated aims that a representative of the OIE joined that committee to facilitate information 
exchange between the OIE and GLOBALG.A.P.72  
 
3.1 Governance 
Retail and food service membership of GLOBALG.A.P. with voting rights accrues from the 
payment of a yearly fee determined by turnover. Group, and individual, producers pay a 
membership fee of 2,550 Euros or 1,550 Euros, respectively. Each type of membership includes 
one Sub-scope and Technical Committee voting right, with an additional fee for each extra 
                                                          
obligatory 1 October 2017) 
http://www.globalgap.org/export/sites/default/.content/.galleries/documents/170630_GG_GR_Livestock_Rules_
V5_1_TC_en.pdf   > accessed 19 November 2017. 
70 GLOBALG.A.P. Annual Report (2015) 
http://www.globalgap.eu/export/sites/default/.content/.galleries/documents/160923_Annual_Report_2015_en.pd
f   >accessed 23 September 2017. 
71 http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/for-producers/globalg.a.p.-add-on/animal-welfare/  >accessed 23 September 
2017.       
72 http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/who-we-are/governance-old/stakeholder-comm./SHC-Animal-Welfare/ 
>accessed 23 September 2017. 
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Sub-scope.73 Certified producer members are entitled to represent their producer interest in 
GLOBALG.A.P.’s governance structure and to use the GLOBALG.A.P. logo on their 
promotional materials at business level.74 Retailers may use the GLOBALG.A.P. Brand in their 
corporate strategy and partake in standard-setting. Membership enables retailers to source 
certified produce and to identify GLOBALG.A.P. certified producers through preferential 
access to a producer’s unique 13 digit certification ID number registered on GLOBALG.A.P.’s 
data base.75 
 
3.1.1 The Board 
GLOBALG.A.P.’s governing Board is elected by GLOBALG.A.P. voting members. It is 
comprised of five elected producer representatives76 and five elected retailer representatives 
for a four year term, headed by an independent chairman. The Board takes the final resolution 
on adopting standards, revisions and new modules. The Board provides direction to the 
                                                          
73 GLOBALG.A.P. Fee Table (2017). For the IFA Livestock Standard, an annual producer registration fee is 
charged based on quantity produced determined for livestock, diary (milk) and poultry, with a fee for each animal 
welfare add-on. Producer groups are accommodated in the certificate and assessment license fees. 
 
http://www.globalgap.org/export/sites/default/.content/.galleries/documents/170411_General-GG-Fee-
Table_2017_V4_en.pdf  >accessed 19 November 2017. 
74 http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/who-we-are/members/supplier/   >accessed 19 November 2017. 
75 http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/buyers/ >accessed 19 November 2017. 
76 At least one producer seat must go to a Livestock representative. 
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GLOBALG.A.P. Secretariat, its acting management, operated by Food Plus GmbH a private 
limited company based in Germany which owns the GLOBALG.A.P. Brand.77  
 
3.1.2 Technical Committee Livestock 
The Board also provides direction to GLOBALG.A.P.’s Technical Committee Livestock, 
comprised of five retailer members and five producer members with livestock expertise. It 
deals with animal health, safety and welfare and develops species-specific modules concerning 
livestock sourcing, identification, traceability, feed and water.78 GLOBALG.A.P. members 
have organised National Technical Working Groups (NTWGs) to assist in applying 
GLOBALG.A.P.’s IFA Livestock Standard on a local scale, identifying local adaptation 
challenges. The NTWGs develop national interpretation guidelines79 which are required to be 
submitted for approval to the Technical Committee Livestock and ultimately for approval to 
the Board.80 National differentiation in interpreting GLOBALG.A.P.’s Livestock Standard 
may, however, be constrained, since GLOBALG.A.P. can withdraw or revise the national 
                                                          
77 GLOBALG.A.P. Board, Terms of Reference (May 2017) 
http://oc8.globalgap.org/export/sites/default/.content/.galleries/documents/170530-GLOBALG.A.P.-Board-
Terms-of-Reference.pdf  >accessed 19 November 2017. 
78 http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/who-we-are/governance/technical-committees/tc-livestock/ >accessed 19 
November 2017.  
79 http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/who-we-are/ntwgs/ >accessed 19 November 2017. 
80 Terms of Reference, Technical Committee Livestock, TC ToR Livestock, Version 2: Sep17, 




interpretation guidelines at any time on an individual point basis if the global integrity of the 
IFA Standard is challenged.81  
There would be the potential to appraise the ‘epistemic nature’ of the expert community 
taking decisions on the IFA Livestock Standard.82 This article, conversely,83 is concerned to 
accommodate stakeholders external84 to the system of committee governance, with an interest 
in the Standard’s animal welfare credentials.  
 
3.1.3 Certification Bodies 
A producer applying to be certified as compliant with the Livestock Standard must choose a 
GLOBALG.A.P. approved certification body, details of which are available on 
GLOBALG.A.P.’s website. The producer pays a fee for such approved third party certification 
and the certificate is valid for one year.85 In turn, and in addition to their associate membership 
fee, certification bodies pay an annual certification licence fee and a certificate fee to 
                                                          
81 http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/who-we-are/ntwgs/nig/nig-approval/index.html  >accessed 19 November 
2017. 
82 Andrew Lang and Joanne Scott identify the concept of ‘managerialism’ in global governance - in ‘The hidden 
world of WTO governance’ (2009) 20(3) European Journal of International Law 575, 610-14.  
‘An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular 
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.’ Peter Haas, 
‘Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination’ (1992) 46 International Organization 
1, 3.   
83 A study of the roles and expertise of the internal standard-setters falls beyond the scope of this article.   
84 In doing so it advocates ‘soft law instruments’ and ‘stakeholder’ ‘inclusiveness,’ Young (n 26) 15, 16. 
85 General Regulations Part I (n 69) ss 4-5. 
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GLOBALG.A.P..86 Third party certification fees compound the costs burden, which may be 
insurmountable for smaller producers in developing countries seeking market access via 
membership.87 This raises questions of ‘fairness’ in the distribution of costs amongst developed 
/ developing country producers.88 GLOBALG.A.P. approved certification bodies must be 
accredited to ISO/IEC 1706589 and, supplementary to having requisite competence, act 
independently, impartially, confidentially and with integrity. As associate members, 
certification bodies do not play a role in the internal governance of GLOBALG.A.P.. Not being 
full members and thus bereft of a vote, they do not have representative rights in the setting of 
the Livestock Standard.90  GLOBALG.A.P. established the Certification Bodies Committee to 
coordinate and supervise the activities of its certifiers and, in 2012, created a South American 
Certification Bodies Committee Subgroup. GLOBALG.A.P. has, further, secured a 
Certification Integrity Programme (CIPRO),91 which monitors and assesses the performance 
of GLOBALG.A.P. approved certification bodies. The Board appointed Integrity Surveillance 
                                                          
86 General Regulations Part III Certification Body and Accreditation Rules: Version 5.1 (1 July 2017, obligatory 
1 October 2017) http://www.globalgap.org/.content/.galleries/documents/170630_GG_GR_Part-
III_V5_1_en.pdf  >accessed 19 November2017. 
87 Hatanaka et al argue, ‘third party certification reorganizes, transforms and disciplines … throughout the supply 
chain, with different social and economic implications for various participants.’ Maki Hatanaka, Carmen Bain, 
Lawrence Busch, ‘Third-party certification in the global agri-food system’ (2005) 30(3) Food Policy 354, 355, 
361- 4. 
88 Henson and Humphrey (n 55) 36. 
89 ISO/IEC 17065 Requirements for bodies certifying products, processes and services (2012) 
https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso-iec:17065:ed-1:v1:en >accessed 19 November 2017. 
90 http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/who-we-are/members/associates/index.html >accessed 19 November 2017. 
91 http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/what-we-do/the-gg-system/integrity-program/CIPRO/index.html >accessed 
19 November 2017. 
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Committee92 takes the final decision on imposing sanctions93 on certifying bodies, which are, 
in turn, implemented and enforced by GLOBALG.A.P.’s Secretariat.94 This stringent system 
of oversight could be said to underscore the independence of the certifiers from their producer 
clients and the credibility of the IFA Certificate.95 The extent to which third-party certification 
of a B2B Livestock Standard is, thus, centrally led, however, detracts from the certifiers’ 
independence from GLOBALG.A.P.’s private regulatory regime.96 
 
 
3.2 Small-Scale Producer Credence 
GLOBALG.A.P. membership status offered to producers and retailers is the definitive 
condition to accrue voting rights and to have a representative voice in the IFA Livestock 
Standard. Europe is GLOBALG.A.P.’s key market; its retailer and producer members are 
predominantly European.97 GLOBALG.A.P. demonstrably has taken strides to engage with the 
smaller local producer to develop capacity to conform to the IFA Livestock Standard 
incrementally. This it has done by introducing an intermediate level localg.a.p. Standard98 and 
                                                          
92http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/who-we-are/governance/Other-committees/integrity-surveillance-
comm./index.html  >accessed 19 November 2017. 
93 Defined by GLOBALG.A.P., General Regulations Part III (n 86)  s 9.3. 
94 ibid. 
95 Paul Verbruggen and Rebecca Schmidt, ‘The Role of Certification in the Enforcement of Transnational Private 
Regulation’ (2012) 24, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2255918  >accessed 19 November 2017. 
96 Hatanaka et al (n 87) 356. 
97 Percentage share of members per continent: Africa 7; Asia 8; Europe 64; North America 10; Oceania 2. 
GLOBALG.A.P. Annual Report (n 70) 14, 38. 




a ‘resembling’ benchmarking scheme and status.99 Resembling schemes partially conform to 
the GLOBALG.A.P. Standard and may proceed to develop ‘supplementary’ requirements that 
bridge the gap earning GLOBALG.A.P. recognition of equivalence. Equivalent status is 
accorded to G.A.P. certification systems worldwide that fully conform to GLOBALG.A.P.’s 
CPCC and General Regulations.100 GlobalG.A.P.’s Standard is ‘diffusing’, ie entering other 
countries ‘through market mechanisms’101 raising standards within developing countries. 
GLOBALG.A.P. has, thus, made genuine efforts to engage with small producers, which is 
further evident in its concessionary fee structure for group membership. Notwithstanding such 
concession, additional rules require the further development of a Quality Management 
System.102 Also, pro rata, lacking the economies of scale103 small producers in developing 
countries effectively bear the burden of the costs of GLOBALG.A.P. approved third party 
certification104 and the consequential inevitability of exclusion from the global agri-food chain.  
 
3.3 External Legitimacy 
In its elevated role as a transnational private collective farm assurance scheme, purportedly the 
industry norm, GLOBALG.A.P.’s IFA Livestock Standard has the potential to impact upon 
                                                          
99 Naiki (n 6) 153-4. 
100 GLOBALG.A.P. Benchmarking Regulations, Version V (2015) 
http://www.globalgap.org/export/sites/default/.content/.galleries/documents/150701_GG_Benchmarking_Regul
ations_V5_0_en.pdf >accessed 19 November 2017. 
101 Naiki (n 6) 143. 
102 GLOBALG.A.P. General Regulations Part II Quality Management System Rules: Version 5.1 (1 July 2017, 
obligatory 1 October 2017) http://www.globalgap.org/.content/.galleries/documents/170707_GG_GR_Part-
II_V5_1_en.pdf   >accessed 19 November 2017. 
103 Henson and Humphrey (n 55) 30. 
104 Hatanaka et al (n 87) 361. 
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stakeholders who are external by definition to its organisational governance but who are 
affected by its regulatory regime.105 This article argues that consumers should be accorded 
further privilege as an interested stakeholder in GLOBALG.A.P.’s regulatory regime and 
identifies the need to seek consumer legitimacy. Equally, the contention is made that it is 
necessary for GLOBALG.A.P., to cultivate external legitimacy for its IFA Livestock Standard 
by interacting with the major public authority, the OIE, in the governance of animal welfare. 
The concept of legitimacy has two dimensions, namely, empirical and normative.106 
Empirical legitimacy is concerned with ‘whether actors accept a rule of an institution as 
authoritative (social legitimacy),’107 and is the approved conception for the purposes of this 
article. Legitimacy defined as ‘the justification of actions to those whom they affect, according 
to reasons they can accept,’108 is deemed to be a useful measure of the social / empirical 
legitimacy of GLOBALG.A.P.’s Standard to stakeholders external to the business regime. 
Furthermore, this article explores the legitimating theories distinguishable as ‘input-
oriented’ or ‘output-oriented legitimacy beliefs’109 and, in so doing, discards the former as 
being impracticable, while positively embracing the latter. In the classic work of Fritz Scharpf, 
[i]nput-oriented legitimizing thought emphasizes ‘government by the people’. Political 
choices are legitimate if and because they reflect the ‘will of the people’ – that is, if 
                                                          
105 Cafaggi (n 65) 46. 
106 Bodansky (n 16) 709. ‘Normative theory asks whether the authority possesses legitimacy,’ Steven Bernstein, 
‘Legitimacy in Intergovernmental and Non-State Global Governance’ (2011) 18(1) Review of International 
Political Economy 17, 20. 
107 Bernstein, ibid. 
108 Melissa S Williams, ‘Citizenship as Agency within Communities of Shared Fate’ in Steven Bernstein and 
William D Coleman (eds) Unsettled Legitimacy: Political Community, Power, and Authority in a Global Era  
(University of British Columbia Press 2009) 33, 43.  
109 Scharpf (n 12). 
24 
 
they can be derived from the authentic preferences of ‘the members of a community, 
… [a] pre-existing collective identity.110  
Fritz Scharpf’s theory of output-oriented legitimacy and effective decision making, ie 
of ‘substantive’ legitimacy, is adopted as the basis of this article’s conception of legitimacy, 
which places emphasis on the need to engage in deliberative dialogue in the development of an 
effective solution,111 
‘Government for the people’ derives legitimacy from its capacity to solve problems 
requiring collective solutions … . What is required is no more than the perception of a 
range of common interests … in constituencies with a ‘thin’ identity lacking organismic 
overtones.112 
Accordingly, in evaluating output oriented legitimacy, the relevant criteria would necessarily 
associate the consideration of diverse and complex interests ‘engaged in deliberative 
interactions’ with the improvement of the ‘substantive quality ‘of the policy outcome.113 
Fundamentally, Jenny Steele’s idea of deliberation is used as a basis for consumer 
legitimacy, which focuses ‘on citizens as a valuable source of knowledge and values’, and 
‘associates reasoned participation with problem-solving … in order to achieve the best 
available decisions.’114 Values are deemed to be ‘central’ in that ‘[d]eliberation’ is meant to 
foster a reasoned form of communication about values, distinct from mere compromises 
                                                          
110 ibid 6, 10. 
111 ibid 20, 21. 
112 ibid 11.  
113 Ibid 13, 20. 
 
114 Steele (n 11) 431, 433. 
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between clashing interests and competing preferences, and in this way to allow resolution of 
the most intractable problems.’115  
This article, further, adopts Chiara Armeni’s characterisation of participation based on 
deliberative democracy, namely ‘dialogue and communication of rational arguments and 
transformation of participants’ views in deliberative models, … in which citizens have a real 
opportunity to influence.’ 116 It is not evident that GLOBALG.A.P. consults other than from a 
business perspective and position, and in a manner of reasoning which necessarily corresponds 
to Julia Black’s hypothesis of ‘thick’ deliberative discourse, where ‘each participant speaks 
and each listens’ and, in consequence, ‘reflect on their views.’117  
In such deliberative discourse there would be room for values and scientific expertise 
despite documented tensions, as epitomised and challenged in the literature.118 Science is 
needed as a basis for all animal welfare standards, since there is a strong correlation between 
animal health and animal welfare. Indeed, ‘disease in farmed livestock … can be considered as 
anything that affects an animal’s wellbeing and welfare.’119 McEldowney et al stress ‘that 
sound science is intrinsic to a better understanding of risk management,’120 and that an animal 
welfare regulatory system ‘must be evidence based.’121 
                                                          
115 ibid 423. 
116 Armeni (n 13) 418, 422 (emphasis added). 
117 Black (n 14) 34, 36, 41. 
118  Bodansky (n 16) 719; Maria Lee, ‘Beyond Safety? The Broadening Scope of Risk Regulation’ (2009) 62(1) 
Current Legal Problems 242. 
119 John McEldowney, Wyn Grant, Graham Medley, The Regulation of Animal Health and Welfare: Science, Law 
and Policy (Routledge 2013) 1. 
120 ibid 15, 167. 
121 ibid 163. 
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This article reasons that standards of animal welfare must be based on more than 
science and advances three explanations why, on its own, a scientific basis for animal welfare, 
albeit essential, is not enough. First of all, it can be said that the science applied to determine a 
standard of animal welfare constitutes a ‘value judgement,’ in that there are, arguably, at least 
three separate conceptions of animal welfare and it will depend on the subjective view held as 
to the most appropriate criterion, which will then determine the science upon which the adopted 
standard is based.122 Scientific opinion may differ – it may overlap or diverge - according to 
which animal welfare criterion is, or criteria are, deemed appropriate based on: basic health 
and functioning (productivity) free from disease and injury; the ‘affective’ state of the animal 
and experiences of, for example,  fear, hunger, pain, pleasure; and /or living a natural life.123 
Conflict inevitably ensues. For example, a scientific decision based on being free from injury 
and supportive of conditions in intensively farmed units would not be synonymous with a 
scientific assessment of animal welfare based on living a natural life, with more space and 
natural light. David Fraser contends that ‘[f]or actions to be widely accepted as achieving high 
animal welfare, in addition to being based on good welfare science, they will need to make a 
reasonable fit to the major value positions about what constitutes a good life for animals.’124 
Secondly, and closely related, science can determine the best course of action based on the 
evidence (and potentially that based on a mixture of all three animal welfare conceptions, where 
that is possible), but a scientific opinion will not be capable of taking a moral stance based on 
                                                          
122 David Fraser, ‘Understanding animal welfare’ (2008) 50(Suppl 1)SI Acta Veterinaria Scandinavica 1, doi: 
10.1186/1751-0147-50-SI-SI. 
123 ibid. 
124 ibid 7.  
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the highest values of animal welfare.125 Thirdly, scientific research may not have kept abreast 
of welfare needs in respect of which account should be taken pre-Standard126 and which a 
values perspective could inject. To substantiate the Standard with the legitimating mechanisms 
of science and values would facilitate ‘effective problem-solving’ and ‘hinder’ any potential 
to act solely for purposes of market differentiation.127 
 
4. Consumer Legitimacy 
GLOBALG.A.P.’s stakeholders are not treated equally regarding participation in its internal 
committee structures. There are no formal representative rights for those affected, for example 
as consumers of GLOBALG.A.P. certified produce. GLOBALG.A.P. is very much a business 
focused organisation and regulatory regime, in which its key stakeholders are producers and 
retailers at the business level. The retailers and producers128 create the animal welfare standards 
against which compliance is exacted129 and determine the outcome of any subsequent Standard 
review. GLOBALG.A.P.’s internal governance rules are thus the determinant of its Livestock 
Standard and animal welfare component.  GLOBALG.A.P.’s standard-setting process does 
realise good practice in limiting decision making to its members when measured against the 
                                                          
125 David Fraser 'Science, Values and Animal Welfare: Exploring the Inextricable Connection’ (1995) 4 Animal 
Welfare 103. 
126 Helenka Telkanranta and Anna Valros, ‘Could pigs have unidentified behavioural needs that warrant inclusion 
in future welfare assessments’, Proceedings of the 7th International International Conference on the Assessment 
of Animal Welfare at Farm and Group Level (Wageningen Academic Publishers 2017) 220.  
127 Scharpf (n 12) 13.  
128 GLOBALG.A.P.’s organisational procedures include producers of agri-produce. It was, originally, solely 
retailer led. Henson and Humphrey (n 47) 1642. 
129 Carmen Bain, Elzabeth Ranson, Michelle R Worosz, ‘Constructing Credibility: Technoscience to Legitimate 
Strategies in Agrifood Governance’ (2010) 25 (3) Journal of Rural Social Sciences 160, 176-7. 
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‘meta-rules’130 of the ISEAL Code of Good Practice for Setting Social and Environmental 
Standards,131 although it may be noted that GLOBALG.A.P. is not evaluated against ISEAL’s 
criteria directly. GLOBALG.A.P. is not voluntarily a Member or Associate Member of 
ISEAL,132 a procedural meta-regulator, its standards concerned with process. 133 
Consumers, conversely, are not members of GLOBALG.A.P. and it may not be 
possible, because of the constitutional rules of its owning company FoodPlus GmBH,134 for 
consumers to be accorded internal representative rights, as committee members, to vote ex ante 
on the IFA Standard Livestock.135 Consumers do not constitute a ‘demos’; they are not able to 
amass the requisite ‘pre-existing commonalities of history, language, culture and ethnicity.’136  
Although it could be said that GLOBALG.A.P.’s animal welfare governance should always 
‘strive continuously’ for ‘the fullest possible participation and representation of those 
                                                          
130 ‘Meta-rules are framing principles that individual regulators implement in their own regulatory instruments.’ 
Cafaggi (n 1) 125 (fn 99).  
131 The ISEAL Code of Good Practice for Setting Social and Environmental Standards (2014) Clause 5.6.  
http://www.isealalliance.org/our-work/defining-credibility/codes-of-good-practice/standard-setting-code 
>accessed 19 November 2017. 
132 Associate members must meet the baseline criteria of the Standard-Setting Code. Full members are required 
to undergo an independent evaluation to assess compliance with the improvement criteria of the ISEAL. ibid. 
133 Fabrizio Cafaggi, ‘Transnational Private Regulation. Regulating Private Regulators’ in Sabino Cassese (ed) 
Research Handbook on Global Administrative Law (Edward Elgar 2016) 212. Available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2615694  18 >accessed 19 November 2017. 
134 ‘Regulators’ scope for action may be bounded, and in any event structured by their institutional environment.’ 
Black (n 4) 157. 
135 Nicolas Hachez and Jan Wouters, ‘A Glimpse at the Democratic Legitimacy of Private Standards: Assessing 
the Public Accountability of GlobalGAP’ (2011) 14(3) Journal of International Economic Law 677, 701. 
136 Scharpf (n 12) 8, 11. 
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affected,’137 this article pursues ‘the practical need for diverse perspectives’138 focusing upon 
output-oriented legitimacy founded upon deliberative and participatory democracy. 
There are grounds upon which to realise optimism in that Spencer Henson and John 
Humphrey comment on the strides that GLOBALG.A.P. has made to open up its consultation 
procedures, in granting two opportunities for external stakeholders to feed into 
GLOBALG.A.P.’s four yearly Standard revision.139 This would fall short of good practice 
principles since, although all comments received in a consultation need not be made public in 
order to be ISEAL compliant,140 it is ISEAL stated good practice to prepare a written synopsis 
of how each material issue has been addressed and to make that synopsis publicly available.141 
GLOBALG.A.P. did provide a brief list in its Annual Report of the revisions made in the 
Livestock Standard Version V, but did not go as far as the best practice countenanced by ISEAL 
in that its consultation process outcomes and how the responses fed into the revision in the case 
of each material issue were not transparently mapped. GLOBALG.A.P.’s internal code of 
conduct in which it commits to values which determine the way in which it communicates and 
acts within the company and with its stakeholders would appear primarily to be customer 
(member) orientated.142  
The producer and retailer / food service supplier are the targets and beneficiaries of its 
B2B Certificate. The focus is upon strong brand assurance of GLOBALG.A.P. certified animal 
                                                          
137 (Emphasis added) Gráinne De Búrca, ‘Developing Democracy beyond the State, (2008) 46 (2) Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 102, 131. 
138 Young (n 26) xii. 
139 Henson and Humphrey (n 55) Executive Summary points 17, 18.   
140 It is ISEAL stated aspirational good practice to make any original comments per group of stakeholders received 
during a consultation exercise publicly available. 
141 ISEAL (n 131) Clause 5.4. 
142  http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/who-we-are/about-us/code-of-conduct/ >accessed 19 November 2017. 
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welfare standard conformity on the part of certified producers sourcing to member retail 
buyers, with no direct link to the consumer. GLOBALG.A.P. should ‘respond’143 to its 
interested and affected consumer stakeholders, since GLOBALG.A.P. requires their ‘active 
support’144 in order effectively to govern through resort to higher animal welfare standards in 
an extended global agricultural produce market and to ‘prosper’.145 Fabrizio Cafaggi explains, 
‘…affected stakeholders have to participate and confer … legitimacy.’146 Yet, in order to do, 
consultation needs to be much deeper than a process.147 
The decisions taken by GLOBALG.A.P. manifest in its Version 5 IFA Standard 
following the two rounds of public consultation should be ‘defensible on grounds other than 
(just) the fairness of the [revision] process.’148 The relevant concern does not lie with whether 
GLOBALG.A.P.’s ‘method is ‘legitimate’,’149 but, with whether the revision consultations 
‘allow for successful development and pursuit of collective goals’150  in the animal welfare 
standards adopted. There is, further, the potential for invited external expertise in 
GLOBALG.A.P.’s Technical Committee Livestock.151 There is, however, no apparent 
guarantee, through sporadic invitation, of a two-way reasoned deliberative discourse 
undertaken ‘on an equal basis’152 in which evidenced based science (as opposed to business 
                                                          
143 Black (n 4) 137. 
144 ibid 154. 
145 ibid 149.  
146 Cafaggi (n 1) 159. 
147 Steele (n 11); Black (n 14). 
148 Steele (n 11) 431. See GLOBALG.A.P. Annual Report (n 70) 22. 
149 Steele (n 11) 431. 
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policy) is discussed along with ethical or value oriented justification for standards of animal 
welfare.  
A recommendation, accordingly, is made for deliberative participation, between 
consumers, representative organisations and other experts on the one hand, and  
GLOBALG.A.P.’s Technical Livestock Committee on the other, the participants meeting in an 
equal capacity, to be an ongoing practice in setting the animal welfare component of 
GLOBALG.A.P.’s IFA Livestock Standard, i.e. ‘preceding’ the Standard.153 There is no 
requirement for there to be a formal structure154 for such reasoned deliberation, so long as the 
voice of values has the opportunity to influence the decision taken on the Standard in a 
‘relatively stable’ and ‘semi-permanent pattern[] of mutual support.’155 As David Levi-Faur 
maintains, ‘[r]egulation involves a continuous action of monitoring, assessment and refinement 
of rules rather than ad hoc operation.’156 Chiara Armeni’s rationale, furthermore, is adopted: 
In so far as an in situ (as opposed to the transient nature of an ad hoc) animal welfare committee 
would have ‘the significant potential to catalyse participation as collaborative problem-solving 
and constitute an alternative forum for deliberative public dialogue’ it ‘might turn …to being 
the beginning of the solution.’157 This article underscores the scope for deliberative democracy, 
as defined, to introduce a values element of animal welfare into the Standard, i.e. a ‘richer 
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rationality’158 which goes above and beyond evidenced-based science, and by so doing elicit 
the legitimacy of the consumer.   
A further contention is that GLOBALG.A.P. should build upon the consumer 
legitimacy thus attained and market the Standard directly to the interested consumer by way of 
an enhanced animal welfare label supported, separately, with the provision of related 
information. Such communicative tools potentially would increase demand for enhanced 
animal welfare agri-produce in a global value chain.159   
 
4.1 An Animal Welfare Label 
The level of recognition of GLOBALG.A.P.’s Livestock Standard among consumers still 
remains in doubt. There is, currently, no prospect of promoting the brand directly to the 
consumer. The IFA Livestock Standard is a B2B Certificate. The GLOBALG.A.P. trademark 
- the word “GLOBALG.A.P.” and its “G”- shape logo - may only be used directly as specified 
in a business context.160 The GLOBALG.A.P. trademark is prohibited from appearing as a 
product label directly linked to certified products. 161 GLOBALG.A.P.’s website dedicates one 
paragraph to consumers interested in verifying, against a thirteen digit GLOBALG.A.P. 
number (GGN),162 that the farm producing the agri-produce is a certified producer. This serial 
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number bears no animal welfare significance at face value. There is no direct indication on the 
retailed produce of the animal welfare added value of agri-food which emanates from those 
producers who are certified to the GLOBALG.A.P. Brand. In marked contrast, 
GLOBALG.A.P. has introduced a consumer label for GLOBALG.A.P. certified aquaculture 
products,163 with an aquaculture logo in addition to a GLOBALG.A.P. number (GGN) and a 
GLOBALG.A.P. website address164 where promotional material creates a ‘virtual’ impression 
of responsible farming / sourcing and fish sustainability. 165 
An animal welfare label which is visible to the consumer could serve to augment 
consumer belief in agri-produce both labelled and certified to a legitimated GLOBALG.A.P. 
IFA Livestock Standard. This article argues, therefore, that GLOBALG.A.P. is missing a 
valuable opportunity to market added-value animal welfare agri-produce,166  in the absence of 
a clearly expressed label which signals the animal welfare credentials of its Standard to 
consumers.  
Similarly, neither a mandatory, nor a voluntary, EU animal welfare label exists.167 
Labelling related to processes was foreseen to increase production costs and cited as a reason 
                                                          
on the certified product, bearing the GGN number or the URL of the GLOBALG.A.P. database. ibid 1 (iv), 2 (i) 
(iii) (iv). 
163 http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/for-consumers/Aquaculture-GGN.org/ >accessed 19 November 2017. 
164 http://ggn.org/en/ >accessed 19 November 2017. 
165 http://aquaculture.ggn.org/en/principles.html >accessed 19 November 2017. 
166 See, further, Christine Parker et al ‘Can the hidden hand of the market be an effective and legitimate regulator? 
The case of animal welfare under a labeling for consumer choice policy approach’ (2017) Regulation & 
Governance doi: 10/1111/rego.12147. 
167 Commission, ‘Options for animal welfare labelling and the establishment of a European Network of Reference 
Centres for the protection and welfare of animals’ COM (2009) 584 final. 
34 
 
why an EU animal welfare label has not materialised.168 A majority of ministers agreed the 
need for further research to establish science-based indicators so that labelling would enable 
consumers to distinguish different levels of animal welfare.169 Correspondingly, the European 
Economic and Social Committee strongly supported a ‘voluntary, harmonised and market-
driven’ labelling scheme, ‘based on scientific criteria, … to promote the marketing of animal 
products that exceed EU minimum requirements’, stating that the information should be 
‘understandable’ and consumers ‘sufficiently alert.’170  
A decision should be taken as to the type of label or information171 that would prove 
effective to translate consumer demand into increased purchasing power172 for animal welfare 
added-value produce, such that consumers would trust this animal welfare agri-food label.173 
EU origin labelling requirements for beef did not prevent ‘foods claiming to have been made 
with beef … contain[ing] horsemeat. … raising concerns about the integrity of labelling 
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disclosures.’174 GLOBALG.A.P.’s Chain of Custody Standard would serve to ensure a trail of 
traceability for farmed agri-produce. In application to Livestock beyond the slaughtering stage 
the Chain of Custody may only be inspected and certified in combination with a Global Food 
Safety Initiative (GFSI) post farm gate standard.175 Additionally, voluntary resort to a private 
animal welfare label could enable producers to engender more trade in animal welfare added-
value produce giving them a competitive advantage in terms of quality over price. Such a label 
would need to be complemented with clearly understandable information. 
 
4.2 Credible information 
In addition to, and separately from, an animal welfare label, there would be the need also to 
provide credible animal welfare information to the consumer. Nicolas Hachez and Jan Wouters 
caution that ‘market mechanisms are hampered by serious information asymmetries and run 
the risk of being highly inaccurate. They also depend on the responsiveness of consumer 
audiences to issues of general interest extending beyond the simple act of consuming.’176 In 
other words, there are ambivalent prospects, such that ‘the market may fail to produce adequate 
information,’ and / or the consumer may ‘lack the expertise required to render technical data 
useful.’177 This article rejects the perspective that ‘individuals are not necessarily competent to 
undertake informed choices,’ being firmly of the opinion that the circumspect consumer 
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‘should be placed in a position to exercise informed choice.’ 178 There is evidence that a 
growing number of EU citizens,179 (64 per cent) would like to have more information about the 
conditions under which farmed animals are treated in their respective countries.180 This 
corroborates the positive view that, ‘the public response is not in fact characterised by 
ignorance or passivity.’181 It is crucial for accurate, transparent and verifiable animal welfare 
information to be posted onto GLOBALG.A.P.’s website supportive of a label providing 
GLOBALG.A.P.’s website address. To do so would lessen any potential inclination to deviate 
from the higher standards transparently portrayed. 
A dedicated animal welfare ‘platform’ on GLOBALG.A.P.’s website is proposed 
which indicates, with examples, the welfare needs of different species of farm animal. Detailing 
the animal welfare standards of major public bodies, for example EU animal welfare norms 
and the Recommendations for animal welfare in the OIE TAHC, with links provided to their 
online data, would foster transparency and inform and educate an interested public. By visibly 
demonstrating exactly where its animal welfare standards are placed vis á vis international 
norms, ie by benchmarking to, and building upon, the public science basis, GLOBALG.A.P. 
would evade any allegations of serving the interests of its members ‘that shape it.’182 It is 
suggested that GLOBALG.A.P. point clearly to its animal welfare objectives, underlining what 
standards exist, for what reasons of welfare need[s] they exist, and in what ways and in respect 
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of which species they go beyond public norms. This would further rule out Julia Black’s 
concern that ‘regulators may attempt to create and manipulate others’ perceptions of their 
legitimacy.’183 Assuming such communicative responsibility would engender a measure of 
comprehension of the animal welfare constituent of the GLOBALG.A.P. IFA Livestock 
Standard that currently is absent. 
It would also bolster credence were GLOBALG.A.P. to demarcate the animal welfare 
expertise that goes into setting its IFA Livestock Standard animal welfare component. 
GLOBALG.A.P. should clearly articulate who are its animal welfare scientific advisers and 
underline their credentials. It should, furthermore, build partnerships with other trusted animal 
welfare standard-setters in order further to promote the added-value animal welfare standards 
of its IFA Livestock Standard. GLOBALG.A.P. should also update an interested public of the 
major international bodies with which it collaborates in an animal welfare context, and provide 
details of the animal welfare research which underpins GLOBALG.A.P.’s IFA Livestock 
Certificate. 
 
5. State Legitimacy 
It is opportune to construct a viable hybrid model of animal welfare governance in the search 
for the external legitimacy of the State. An increasing portion of business regulation emanates 
from the dynamic interaction of hybrid public-private institutions operating transnationally,184 
yet there is an absence of such an effective governance interaction in the policy domain of 
animal welfare. The definition of hybrid governance is adopted in which the actors or 
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stakeholders are public (State / intergovernmental) bodies and private (non-State) 
organisations.185   
 
5.1 Meta- Regulation? 
A developing phenomenon in transnational private regulation is the growth of the private meta-
regulator, and of sector-specific meta-standardisation, the rationale being to ‘bolster[] … the 
integrity, legitimacy and accountability of private regulatory regimes’.186 Meta-regulation 
implies a process in which ‘[t[he primary control responsibilities are … carried out within the 
… management systems of corporations and the regulator’s role becomes the auditing, 
monitoring, and incentivizing of these systems.’187  One example of a sectoral meta-regulator 
would be the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI). Existing food safety standards schemes are 
evaluated for equivalence against the GFSI’s regulatory criteria on governance, procedure and 
content.188 GLOBALG.A.P. is such a recognised scheme.189  There is no formal meta-regulator 
of private animal welfare standards. Arguably, it could be necessary to form an operative 
system of coordination of practices which affect a range of stakeholders along an extended 
food chain, by introducing a system of meta-regulation of private transnational farm assurance 
standards and certification schemes operating with the potential to control the global agri-food 
chain.  
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Would potential EU meta-regulation of private animal welfare standards190 through 
accreditation by third party certification provide a meta-regulatory model for adaptation at the 
global level?  Benchmarking could operate as a mode of animal welfare governance, whereby 
meta-standards would act as ‘catalysts for bringing about changes in practice in order that 
conformity with those target standards would be achieved.’191 The European Commission has 
proposed an option of a legislative framework which would authorise the benchmarking of 
private certification schemes with animal welfare claims. Instead of adopting higher public 
standards, there would be scope for the private agri-food sector to market to the higher animal 
welfare criteria in a proposed Regulation, within a transparent and controlled process. The 
Commission envisages that such a voluntary benchmarking structure for EU registered private 
schemes would increase market opportunity and price premiums for EU producers who engage 
with higher animal welfare standards, as well as efficiency gains in benchmarking to a single 
EU standard.192 An interesting comparative example would be the existing EU normative 
requirement for producers of biofuels marketed in the EU to benchmark to EU sustainability 
criteria, certification to which must meet formal accreditation conditions.193 This meta-standard 
‘sets basic requirements and then allows the regulated community to use existing standards that 
have been benchmarked to the meta-standard to certify compliance.’194 The EU outsources 
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certification to private commercial for ‘profit’ third-party auditors.195 Jolene Lin submits that 
‘the need for certification schemes to maintain credibility in order to remain in the 
“marketplace” leads to behaviour that enhances legitimacy.’196 Using ‘the principal-agent 
framework developed in delegation theory’, she continues, ‘the agent’s quest for legitimacy 
acts as a countervailing incentive against slack and, in fact, serves to align the preferences of 
the agent [auditor] and the principal [EU].’197 While offering a comparative meta-regulatory 
model with the propensity to justify the legitimacy of private regulatory regimes, this article 
questions whether such a meta-regulator of transnational private animal welfare standards 
schemes would be opportune and submits that meta-regulation should be considered only as a 
last-resort.  
Jody Endres maintains that ‘criteria and indicators of benchmarked standards need 
continual reassessment as scientific knowledge grows.’198 More particularly, she cautions that, 
inter alia, ‘important question arise as to whether such standards can truly incorporate 
countries’ differing notions of social and economic welfare.’ In this light, this article deems 
meta -standards not to be as effective as resort to linking the major private and public animal 
welfare bodies, namely GLOBALG.A.P. and the OIE. The complex nature of animal welfare 
should be recalled together with the modus operandi of working to achieve consensus between 
developed and developing countries in the animal welfare recommendations of the OIE TAHC, 
which standards duly obtain as the international reference standards.  
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This article places emphasis upon seeking the legitimacy of stakeholders external to the 
collective standard scheme, based on reciprocity and deliberative dialogue. A preference is 
held for an alternative hybrid solution, for a soft-law mechanism, namely a collaborative 
document undertaken on a horizontal199 understanding, formally orchestrated, but more 
flexible and informal than meta-regulation.  Governance, moreover, ‘encompass[es] non-state 
action and “soft” norms.’200 It is relevant and timely to secure a scientifically determined 
baseline of animal welfare protection underpinning the privately assured global Standard, and 
for GLOBALG.A.P. to identify its higher animal welfare standards going beyond the minimum 
norms with which compliance is a legal requirement. This stems from the effects of the regime 
on its external stakeholders, the capacity to control the global agri-food chain, and the overall 
complexity in, and lack of clarity of, GLOBALG.A.P.’s animal welfare information. At the 
same time, as Spencer Henson and John Humphrey confirm, ‘it is important … to see private 
standards as part of broader trends in value chain coordination in the context of ongoing 
changes in regulatory controls, consumer demand, and so on.’201  The hybrid nature of food 
governance in which public and private bodies increasingly coordinate their activities is further 
corroborated by Paul Verbruggen and Tetty Havinga.202 This article reasons that its proposed 
soft-law hybrid model of transnational animal welfare governance undertaken in horizontal 
accord and deliberative mode would provide the requisite solutions. Such soft-law State 
‘facilitation,’ it is argued, would legitimise and increase the effectiveness of the private 
collective regulatory regime.203   
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The World Trade Organization (WTO) and the OIE, in response to concerns about private 
standards, have adopted a Resolution on the role of public and private standards in animal 
welfare,204 which recommends, inter alia, that the OIE Director General encourage global 
private standard-setting bodies to work toward transparency of private standards. Meeting to 
discuss the next steps to be taken towards implementing its recommendations, the OIE noted 
that the global private standard-setting bodies such as the GFSI and GLOBALG.A.P. were well 
placed to foster and facilitate collaborative undertakings. The meeting participants suggested: 
identifying mechanisms for collaboration; assessing the state of the problem with certification 
association costs; exploring collaboration in capacity building; working level collaboration in 
the standard-setting process of agricultural practices (GLOBALG.A.P.); sharing information 
for transparency; input at advisory board level; and, significantly, to ‘continue to pursue the 
development of official agreements, starting with GLOBALG.A.P. and GFSI.’205  
The case can be made for GLOBALG.A.P. and the OIE as major animal welfare 
standard-setting bodies to engage in coordinated dialogue and to draw up a joint memorandum 
of understanding, a soft-law hybrid206 governance tool, in which undertakings by both Parties 
are agreed and adopted under signature. Such a collaborative memorandum would offer an 
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alternative solution to, and should be distinguished from, that of meta-regulation. Hybridity in 
meta-regulation where WTO Members and third parties participate in international standard-
setting would be problematic, potentially, for the multi-lateral regulatory regime of the World 
Trade Organization with respect to technical regulations in accordance with the Technical 
Barriers to Trade Agreement 1994.207  
In becoming Party to a memorandum of understanding with the OIE the internationally 
recognised intergovernmental animal welfare standard-setter, GLOBALG.A.P. would be 
adding to its associations with leading international organisations.208 Kaarlo Tuori would be a 
proponent of such ‘dialogue’, ‘discourse’ and ‘mutual communication’ in a transnational 
setting.209 The more deliberative inter-relational model of liaison and mutually reinforcing210 
discourse between the two major animal welfare standards bodies is this article’s suggested 
model for the complex topic of animal welfare, which has multi-dimensional elements, 
including those of economics, society and trade. Hans-W Micklitz considers ‘the outward 
interaction between the public and the private’ to be ‘essential to an understanding of 
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hybrids.’211 A proposed memorandum of understanding between the major public and private 
animal welfare standard-setting bodies would ‘open[..] up the perspective’212 Precedents 
exist213 in the cooperation agreement entered into between the GFSI and the OIE,214 for 
example, or in that entered into between the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) and the OIE.215 The terms of such a hybrid soft law agreement would incorporate 
undertakings by both Parties, in which each pledges its own interest in entering into such an 
understanding in animal welfare, reciprocal meeting participation and, in particular, the 
promotion of the use of the international standards under the respective mandate of each Party, 
together with awareness raising in Member Countries. It is important that the interests of 
stakeholders should be accommodated by GLOBALG.A.P. pledging to engage with producer 
members fairly to distribute costs (membership / certification fees) geographically along the 
supply chain.216 The memorandum of understanding between GLOBALG.A.P. and the OIE 
should also contain a clause in which the OIE science-based animal welfare standards would 
be recognised as constituting the basic minimum floor of animal welfare protection for those 
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species of farm animal in respect of which an OIE Chapter exists.217 GLOBALG.A.P.’s animal 
welfare standards would be required to be assessed scientifically to the same minimum level, 
beyond which it would then be able to market agri-produce certificated to GLOBALG.A.P.’s 
IFA Livestock Standard.  
It is relevant to recall the documented tension between science and participation and to 
reinforce this article’s argument both for deliberative dialogue and the need for a scientific base 
to establish the external legitimacy of the private animal welfare standards.   Science on its own 
is not enough to legitimise the animal welfare component of the private collective Livestock 
Standard, but science is needed as a basis.218  A minimum science-based floor would serve to 
remove any inclination solely for market differentiation goals and the tension / potential for 
conflict with the OIE. The scope exists, simultaneously, for ‘reasoned discourse’ through which 
‘public reason’ would also ‘invoke mutuality’219 through the legitimating mechanism of a 
memorandum of understanding. 
Reinforced GLOBALG.A.P. / OIE relations would align the former organisation’s 
standards with the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS Agreement) and the ‘science-based obligations’ laid down therein,220 in which 
the OIE TAHC is accorded formal recognition as ‘the relevant international organization.’221 
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GLOBALG.A.P.’s Standard would be reinforced by the link with the ‘international standards, 
guidelines and recommendations developed under the auspices of the OIE’ as defined in the 
SPS Agreement.222  
Fabrizio Cafaggi claims that ‘public and the private spheres influence each other.’223 
For Eberlain et al ‘interaction’ means the myriad ways in which governance actors and 
institutions engage with and react to one another.224 Not only would the memorandum of 
understanding constitute ‘retrospective recognition of privately designed standards’225 by the 
OIE, it may also serve to instigate the adoption of public animal welfare standards for those 
species where currently a chapter does not exist. This would bolster further the need for private 
standards to be justified in accordance with a developed existing science base, removing the 
scope for private standards merely to be marketing tools. Moreover, the reinforced higher 
private standards would be bolstered by the promotional endorsement of GLOBALG.A.P.’s 
standards by the OIE in the memorandum of understanding. Building upon this latter, the scope 
and incentive would exist for GLOBALG.A.P. to justify its corporate mission statement and 
objectives226 as the global industry standard inclusive of animal welfare and to transcend the 
‘bottom-line’ in accordance with David Vogel’s ‘race to the top’.227 It is in GLOBALG.A.P.’s 
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interest to generate revenue for its certified added-value agri-produce and accordingly to 
ratchet up its standards in order to do so. 
   Deliberative dialogue is advocated because of the dual roles and responsibilities of 
public and private animal welfare bodies concerning the interest of raising animal welfare 
standards in developing countries, which responsibility GLOBALG.A.P. evidently is 
developing incrementally. Linda Fulponi alludes to the capacity of private standards to ‘provide 
incentives for physical and human capital development in order to raise technical 
competencies, leading to market access and earnings.’228 GLOBALG.A.P.’s incremental local 
development schemes further support and bolster the process in presenting positive 
opportunities for stakeholders in the global agri-food chain. GLOBALG.A.P., conversely, 
cannot be expected to reflect stakeholder interests to the extent of destroying the market 
opportunities its elevated collective animal welfare standards would present.229   It is in the 
public interest and therefore in the interest of the OIE that producer stakeholders develop 
capacity to meet the higher animal welfare requirements. Public animal welfare standards tend 
to be minimal or lowest common denominator standards based on science, ‘leaving market 
actors to define private standards that extend beyond this minimum.’230 For this reason, Spencer 
Henson and Thomas Reardon underscore the role of public policy-makers in ‘facilitating 
compliance with private standards … where these predominate and have become the basis of 
competitiveness, especially in the case of vulnerable groups that face potential 
marginalisation.’231  A clause in the proposed memorandum of understanding should, 
                                                          
228 Fulponi (n 54) 11. 
229 Henson and Humphrey (n 55) Executive Summary point 26. 
230 Spencer Henson and Thomas Reardon, ‘Private agri-food standards: Implications for food policy and the agri-
food system’ (2005) 30(3) Food Policy 241, 252.  
231 ibid.  
48 
 
accordingly, record the respective responsibilities of each Party toward those producers who 
would struggle to meet the higher private standards.  
It is with further regard to the building of bridges between the major public and private 
animal welfare bodies of the OIE and GLOBALG.A.P. respectively, in the hybrid governance 
of animal welfare that this article explores the contextual significance of the aforementioned 
Cooperation Agreement concluded between the OIE and the ISO.232 
 
5.3 Bridging the Public / Private Divide 
The OIE has been working with the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) under 
the terms of their joint Cooperation Agreement, pursuant to which the ISO has adopted a 
Technical Specification, ISO T/S 34700, on ‘Animal welfare management - General 
requirements and guidance for organizations in the food supply chain.’233 The drafting of this 
management tool was the subject of negotiation in Working Group 16 (the OIE having 
Observer Status),234 prior to its adoption by the ISO Technical Committee 34 Food Products.235 
Its objective is to facilitate the implementation of the animal welfare standards of the OIE, 
supportive of developing countries meeting science-based minimum floor animal welfare 
standards. It will further provide guidance for the implementation of public and / or private 
                                                          
232 (n 215). 
233 01-12-2016 [ISO/TS 34700:2016(E)].  See Sandrine Tranchard, ‘New ISO Specification for better 
management of animal welfare worldwide’ https://www.iso.org/news/2016/12/Ref2147.html >accessed 19 
November 2017. 
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standards that meet at least the OIE TAHC, and the integration of animal welfare principles in 
business to business relations. It is anticipated that the ISO T/S 34700 will act as a 
bridge between the public and private sphere in the setting and monitoring of animal welfare 
standards. Working towards the implementation of the animal welfare standards of the OIE 
TAHC, which are embedded in science, it will serve to embed a minimum floor of animal 
welfare protection, and be a determinant of market access for agri-produce. It should prove a 
valuable tool for developing countries, otherwise largely dependent on meeting the animal 
welfare requirements of the privately set and certified farm assurance schemes and any 
transnational private animal welfare regulatory regime with the potential to be the industry 
norm with exclusionary effects.  
ISO T/S 34700 is a welcome addition to the hybrid governance of animal welfare, 
which, it is foreseen, will interact in parallel with the proposed GLOBALG.A.P. / OIE 
memorandum of understanding.  ISO T/S 34700 is a landmark management tool, albeit it may 
not be a perfect bridge between private and public animal welfare standard-setting bodies, since 
conformity with / benchmarking to the ISO animal welfare management tool would be to the 
basic level of animal welfare protection, albeit based on science, although not comprehensive 
in application to certain species of farm animal. In the absence of any associated system of 
conformity assessment it is lacking in terms of assurance. It may prove a useful exercise, on 
review, to assess whether guidance is needed in its implementation and, inter alia, whether 
more transparent information to the consumer should be forthcoming. In the event that it is 
facilitative of developing countries meeting the OIE science-based animal welfare standards 
and of securing market access, it underpins sustainability and entry to the global agri-food 
chain. Its successful implementation may prove to be the catalyst to GLOBALG.A.P. pledging 
to meet the minimum science-based level of animal welfare standards emanating from the OIE. 
The significance of such an occurrence should be emphasised. The success of the ISO 
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management tool may be the added impetus to GLOBALG.A.P. engaging in coordinated 
dialogue with the OIE so as to highlight its enhanced animal welfare standard-setting and 
certification role transnationally, firmly embedded upon the OIE science-based animal welfare 
standards. It would incentivise GLOBALG.A.P. to differentiate its IFA Livestock Standard in 
aiming higher and exceeding the animal welfare standards of the OIE TAHC the facilitation of 
which latter standards only is promoted in the ISO Technical Specification. 
The scope would exist beyond ISO T/S 34700 for GLOBALG.A.P. to elevate standards 
of animal welfare in a global market for added-value agricultural produce in which small 
producer access also is incentivised, with the proviso that these higher standards have been 
legitimated in the process. It has been the focus of this article to capture the external 
legitimisation of these higher standards via soft-law deliberative mechanisms ‘tuned’ to the 
respective interests and reciprocal dealings of stakeholders external to the private regulatory 
regime.  It is timely to remind of the proposed animal welfare informative GLOBALG.A.P. 
platform. A periodic monitoring and evaluative review of the constituent elements of the 
memorandum of understanding and the roles of the Parties in practice would be reinforced by 
the transparent exchange of data. GLOBALG.A.P.’s IFA Livestock Standard, duly 
substantiated, could ‘provide a bridge between producers in developing countries and 
consumer preferences in high-income markets’236 presenting opportunities for such 
stakeholders in opening up a global animal welfare added-value agri-food chain.237 
GLOBALG.A.P.’s collective private Standard possesses the potential to raise animal welfare 
in instances where countries inter-governmentally have not been able to agree because of 
                                                          
236 Maertens and Swinnen (n 62) 12. 
237 Garry Smith, ‘Interaction of Public and Private Standards in the Food Chain’ (2009) OECD Food, Agriculture 
and Fisheries Working Paper No 15 para 7, 5. 
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different national animal welfare standards per country – per species.238 Although, the need 
alongside continues for a public interest role and responsibility. Hybrid governance through 
reinforced complementary between major animal welfare standards is the way forward:  major 
public and private bodies working together to get the best out of private standardisation239 for 
stakeholders, with improvements in animal welfare in globally sourced agri-food.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This article has considered the potential for private business collective animal welfare 
standards to become the de facto industry norm controlling the global food chain, with effects 
for stakeholders in agri-food who are outside the internal workings of the regime, in particular 
the consumer and the State. It has engaged in a desk-based case study of the governance rules 
relevant to the private collective IFA Livestock Standard of GLOBALG.A.P. and has identified 
the apparent need for GLOBALG.A.P. actively to seek external legitimacy, placing emphasis 
on the legitimating mechanism of output-oriented deliberative democracy. It has made some 
proposals towards changing the status quo, since there are opportunities for influential 
participatory discourse and dialogue undertaken in horizontal accord that would effectively 
legitimate private collective animal welfare standards infused, thus, with both science and 
values. 
In particular, GLOBALG.A.P.’s consultation procedures and committee systems need 
further to harness the voice of the animal welfare ethical consumer, through mutually 
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supportive deliberation and participation in which the consumer is influential, such that both a 
values element and a minimum floor of science become integral to the IFA Livestock Standard. 
There could be a link in developing consumer credence and, potentially, increased demand for 
higher animal welfare agri-produce. The potential further may exist for external smaller 
producers to engage with animal welfare improvements and to disperse their costs over 
increased output to meet that demand in an extended value chain.  
Likewise, a memorandum of understanding between the major public and private 
animal welfare standard-setters, namely the OIE and GLOBALG.A.P., which incorporates 
their respective and mutually reinforcing undertakings achieved through deliberative discourse, 
may also have positive spill-over effects. Reciprocal pledges by the major public and private 
bodies in which each Party endorses the animal welfare standards in the mandate of the other, 
concerned with the interests and capacities of developing countries in meeting science-based 
animal welfare standards and aiming higher would underscore the dual nature of the public / 
private responsibilities. In parallel, the recently adopted ISO Technical Specification provides 
a management tool facilitative of market access to those producers who meet OIE animal 
welfare standards while also accommodating private higher standards of animal welfare 
meeting ‘at least’ those science-based standards. The legitimacy gained through the interaction 
of the major public and private standardisation bodies would bolster GLOBALG.A.P.’s 
Livestock Standard with the potential to enhance animal welfare in the global market for 
agricultural produce.  
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